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After sixteen years of military and political engagement in Afghanistan, the U.S. is not any 
closer to its goal of achieving a stable democratic Afghanistan. Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan 
have been thwarted by the insurgency led by the Taliban, the group the U.S. has toppled sixteen 
years ago. Today, even U.S. senior generals do not see victory in Afghanistan, but a stalemate.  
This paper maintains that what the U.S. basically has in Afghanistan is not a Taliban or a 
Pakistan problem, but a conceptual error problem. Because of this error, the U.S. is in a vicious 
cycle that keeps conflating state-building with nation-building and violates the essence of nation-
building. The paper presents two major strategies by which the U.S. can correct its error. The 
dual strategies suggest four ways how the U.S. can exit from Afghanistan, leaving behind a 







Despite the U.S. and other NATO members’ sacrifices so far, Afghanistan is still far from a 
stable country. The Afghan state is weak and ineffective; and its government is divided and 
corrupt. Giving up hope on their government and country, every year, thousands of young 
Afghans leave their country in search of better opportunities in other countries.  
It is the insurgency run by the Taliban, which has made Afghanistan chaotic and ungovernable. 
Today, regularly, suicide bomb attacks rock the capital city, Kabul. The suicide bombs do not 
only cause widespread carnage, but they also undermine the Afghanistan’s government’s 
credibility and ability to keep its own people safe.   
It is essential and timely to investigate the reasons why the U.S. has failed to defeat the Taliban-
led insurgency after sacrificing 2,500 American servicemen and women and spending 
approximately $1 trillion on the war. It is necessary to raise the question anew because, 
according to U.S. generals and policy experts, the U.S. currently finds itself in a stalemate. The 
peace talks underway between the U.S. and the Taliban are nowhere close to reaching an 
agreement to let the U.S. leave Afghanistan with a modicum of victory.    
Given the enormity of the cost of the Afghan war and no winning strategy after 18 years of 
engagement, it will be just the time to ask hard questions about the cause of the stalemate and to 
discuss potential exit strategies from Afghanistan.   
In its analysis of the stalemate, the essay asserts that the main cause of the problem has been lack 
of conceptual clarity about key policy-related political science-based concepts and the 
consequent missteps that arises from such an error.  As the result, contrary to what the U.S. 
policymakers expect, the U.S. presence and its activities in Afghanistan are antithetical to the 
stated policy goals. Therefore, what the U.S. has in Afghanistan is not a Taliban or a Pakistan 
problem, but a conceptual problem, related to democracy-, state-, and nation-building. And this 
problem arises because U.S. policymakers either have not properly defined these terms or have 
not sequenced their actions around the three areas properly. Unless the U.S. recognizes its error 
in these areas and makes the necessary timely policy corrections, then it will dig itself deeper 





Conceptual Errors  
Political theory and practice require that we recognize the difference between nation, state, and 
democracy, and the associated processes of nation-building, state-building, and democracy-
building.  
Often, senior American officials describe U.S. engagement in Afghanistan as nation-building and 
democracy-building. If so, then is the U.S. up to the right mission? If the U.S. doing them the 
right way? To test the success and failure of the U.S.  in Afghanistan, we must first these 
political categories, namely nation-building, state-building, and democracy-building, is called for 
in our search for a solution for America’s dilemma in Afghanistan.  
Nation/ Nationalism: A nation refers to a community of people who share a common origin and 
history, social and cultural ties, and the aspiration for political sovereignty.1 For a group of 
people to reach a stage of nationhood (as defined here) is a protracted process that usually takes 
centuries to complete.  In the modern-age, nationhood culminates when a people establish a 
sovereignty state.  A state is a legally recognized a community of people that possess cohesion 
among its constituent peoples’ groups and with a state free from outside domination and 
interference. 
State/ Sovereignty: The state is quite a concrete concept. A state, in its political definition, 
possesses two major attributes: a territory with well-defined and internationally recognized 
borders, and a sovereign government which can exercise effective jurisdiction throughout the 
state territory. State-building involves establishing effective governmental structures, including 
the bureaucracy, the army, the police, and the courts. An effective state is one which can keep 
law and order throughout the territory, protect its national sovereignty from outside interference, 
and provide efficient public services to all its citizens.   
Democracy: Democracy refers to a government that allows citizens, through elections, to 
determine who gets political power to lead the nation. Democracy, in its liberal form, entails a 
 





government whose powers are limited by a constitution and a state whose citizens are free to 
exercise political rights and civil liberties.  
In the people’s estimate, national sovereignty takes precedence over any other political benefit, 
over any amenity the state can provide or over any freedom democracy can guarantee.  The 
people always want first to secure their nation’s sovereignty.  
Here is the question: which of the three imperatives (i.e., nationhood, statehood, and democracy) 
a community of people give priority if all three are at stake? History is our guide. A working 
state apparatus (i.e., state-building) and a competitive popular democracy (democracy-building) 
usually wait until the community of people are recognized as a nation.  
Hence, there must be a well-planned policy priority in implementing actions related to the three 
processes. We must respect the inherent hierarchy between the three processes. For example, if 
the three processes are all still pending, then the first step must involve nation-building, which is 
to ensure the sovereignty of the people, by freeing them from any outside domination. The 
second step that follows is state-building, which involves securing territorial integrity and 
ensuring domestic tranquility and setting up a functional government. Democracy-building is a 
crowning step in designing governance, involving a political system based on law, competitive 
elections, and rights.  
 
Quagmire 
As events unfold in Afghanistan over the years, it has become increasingly clear that U.S. 
policymakers have created a virtual quagmire in Afghanistan because they have failed to make 
the proper conceptual and practical distinctions between nation-, state-, and democracy-building 
processes. For example, policymakers believe that they are engaged in nation-building while 
they are not. The U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is at crosscurrents with the notion of nation-
building as described here. Since nation-building, in its essence, suggests national sovereignty by 
getting rid of outside domination and interference, the U.S. in Afghanistan is an act that violates 





Inadvertently, the U.S. continued presence in Afghanistan has given birth to the Taliban 
insurgency. Today, by the estimates of many Afghans, their weak central government is not the 
embodiment of their national sovereignty, but a cover for American occupation and domination. 
Particularly among the Pashtuns, who make the plurality of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, it is the 
Taliban, instead of the central governments, which is taken as the torchbearer of their nationhood 
and sovereignty.  
Today many recognize that nationalism motivates the Taliban insurgency, of gaining Afghan 
sovereignty, free from U.S./ NATO presence and even an Afghan government the Taliban 
believes is a puppet entity. Hence, instead of nation-building, what the U.S. has created is a 
tough-to-beat resistance movement whose main goal is to recover Afghanistan’s full sovereignty 
by expelling U.S. and NATO forces its territory.  As the result, because of the Taliban 
insurgency, America’s other efforts in in the areas of state- and democracy-building have been 
continually frustrated. Practically, the U.S. has put the cart before the horse.  
If history is any guide, it is hard to destroy a nationalist movement.  At some point, it is possible 
that a war-weary American public would tell U.S. policymakers to pull the U.S. forces out of 
Afghanistan altogether. But any pull out which is hasty can lead to a reversal of much of the 
gains the U.S. and its allies have achieved so far in Afghanistan. A hasty U.S. withdrawal can 
lead to a total takeover of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The Taliban is no friend of elections, 
human rights, modern education, and normal foreign relations.  
U.S. policymakers responsible for Afghanistan are virtually running out of time. The status quo 
(in the form of a stalemate) is not sustainable.  U.S. policymakers must act quickly and prudently 
for two main reasons.  The more the Afghan war drags on, it can erode the fighting moral of 
America soldiers.  The soldiers would start to notice that they have little to show for their 
repeated of deployments. They would start to lose confidence in their commanders. Secondly, at 
some point, tired of the war, the American public may start to clamor for a victory or a 
withdrawal. If the generals cannot deliver a quick victory or the politicians can achieve a 






It is not likely that the U.S.-Nato forces can score a quick victory against the Taliban.  That 
possibility is becoming increasingly clear to many in the U.S.   
To avoid a demoralized U.S. defense forces because of quagmire, or to prevent a precipitative 
withdrawal from Afghanistan that will wipe out all the gains made so far, then U.S. policymakers 
must rethink their Afghan strategy thoroughly. Here are a few ways how to do this.   
 
 
The U.S. on the Bar 
What is required among American policymakers now is to realize what they have in Afghanistan 
is not a Pakistan or a Taliban problem, but a conceptual problem. What they are engaged in the 
name of nation-building is the antithesis of the goal of nation-building, which is political 
sovereignty. They must recognize that nation-building cannot be separated from the ideas of 
national sovereignty and nationalism. They must see that state-building is not fungible with 
nation-building. 
There are some sensible options to U.S. strategy to exit from Afghanistan in a way that meets its 
basic objectives of leaving behind a country which is stable and responsible in its foreign 
relations behavior. There are ways by which the future Afghanistan will be a country that can 
pose little threat to the U.S. or the rest of the world community. A few strategies can help the 
U.S. to overcome its conceptual error and achieve its goal of ensuring an Afghan. The strategies 
propose ways in which the U.S. can end the insurgency responsibility and put Afghanistan on a 








This Way Out 
For the U.S. to achieve its aim in Afghanistan–leaving behind a country that is stable and a 
government that will not provide a haven for jihadist groups–there are four viable options to 
explore. The first two options involve ways to moderate the Taliban and reach accommodations 
with it. The remaining two options suggest ways how the U.S. can cultivate secular nationalistic 
forces which can work as an alternative to the Taliban, for Afghans to rally around.   
  
i). Calling Riyadh 
Taliban’s rigid Islamist ideology and policies have their roots in Wahhabism, started and 
supported by Saudi Arabia. Throughout their career years, the Taliban have much relied on Saudi 
Arabia for doctrine, finance, and diplomatic recognition.  Saudi Arabia has provided an untold 
amount of support for the Taliban either directly or indirectly through Pakistan. However, today, 
a wind of change is blowing through Saudi Arabia, and the country is changing in profound 
ways. Saudi Arabia is turning away from Wahhabism and cutting ties with radical Islamic 
groups. There lies the U.S. chance to bring about a moderation in the stance of the Taliban at any 
peace negotiating table.  
The U.S. should take advantage of the religious reform in Saudi Arabia and its cozy relationship 
with the new royals in power. This is a rare window of opportunity that the U.S. can afford to 
waste.  
There are three main reasons why this strategy can work: 
First, despite the reforms underway in Saudi Arabia, there is one thing that did not change, even 
has become worse. This is Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran. Seeing the Taliban restored in 
Afghanistan will give Saudi Arabia a staunch Sunni ally perching on the eastern borders of its 
arch-rival, Iran. It is likely that it will interest the Saudis in working with the U.S. as both there 





Second, because of the ideological changes underway in Saudi Arabia, the Taliban would feel 
necessary to reform its radical policies not to lose the support its once staunch ally, Saudi Arabia. 
The Taliban will recognize that it will have challenges to govern Afghanistan without the 
economic and diplomatic support it gets from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.   
Third, Pakistan’s support for the Taliban always has a Saudi dimension. In many regards, 
Pakistan carried out the wishes of Riyadh when it turned its land into a hub of the mujahideen 
indoctrination, training, and transit point.  Through a request the U.S. places, the Saudis can put 
pressure on Pakistan so that Pakistan can force the Taliban to moderate its rigid ideological and 
policy stances. The Pakistanis have their own economic interest at stake not to antagonize Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf states. For an agreed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban 
returning to power in Kabul, Pakistan can go along the plan to tame the Taliban and other 
Afghan insurgent groups. Pakistan wants the Taliban back on the saddle in Kabul for its balance-
of-power act vis-à-vis its arch-regional rival, India.  
If, after negotiations, the Taliban becomes the next Afghanistan government, it will make a 
moderate government under the oversight of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. As part of the peace 
deal, the U.S. and others can persuade Taliban to change its policies, for example, on human and 
political rights. In that way, the Afghanistan the U.S. leaves behind in the hands of the Taliban 
will be mostly one to its liking.  
Riyadh holds the key that can help the U.S. to solve its Taliban and Pakistan problem.  But the 
U.S. must not waste the window of opportunity that has now opened in Riyadh in the form of 
Mohammed Bin Salman’s reforms.  The access to Taliban runs through Riyadh and Rawalpindi. 
 
ii). Major Powers to the Rescue 
The same outcome of attenuating the Taliban’s rigid ideology and policies can be achieved 
through a second strategy. The U.S. by involving regional powers in a peace conference called 
out to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, can put pressure on the Taliban to moderate its 





Arabia will be necessary as these regional powers have their individual interest to see a stable, 
prosperous and neighborly Afghanistan emerging once the U.S. forces leave the region.  
These powers, despite their ideological differences and geo-political rivalries, in relations to 
Afghanistan, want to prevent, at any cost, Afghanistan becoming a failed state or a radical 
Muslim state which serves as a hub for international jihadist groups. At least their objectives in 
preventing Afghanistan becoming a hub for radical Islamist ideology and activity intersect. It is 
this selfish interest existing as a common factor among these important nations which the U.S. 
must recognize and wisely leverage to exit Afghanistan in a way that meets its minimum 
requirements. If the U.S. negotiates the future of Afghanistan, it will have these major powers on 
its side if it proposes to hand over power only to a Taliban which is moderate in its ideology and 
foreign policy orientation. 
Any transitional government, led by the Taliban, that takes power in Kabul, as the result of the 
major powers’ conference pressure, will be careful enough to craft its domestic and foreign 
policies in a way that will never be perceived as a threat by any of these powers. It is natural to 
expect that the Taliban will be foolhardy to antagonize all these major powers by insisting on a 
jihadist ideology which nearly all of them consider with alarm. The Taliban-led transitional 
government will be wise enough to understand that they need powerful foreign friends to 
succeed. In today’s highly inter-connected and inter-dependent world, the Taliban cannot go it 
alone without at least one of these major regional powers remaining as its friend.  
If the U.S. follows this route, its rate of success to get the Taliban to moderate its positions is 
high. Since every one of these countries regards with suspicion radical jihadist ideology, it is 
unlikely that the Taliban be able to drive a wedge at the negotiating table between the U.S. and 
the other major powers and get what it wants. 
 
iii). Looking for an Afghan Ataturk  
It is possible that the Taliban will reject the request to moderate its ideology and policies as a 





promoted by the Taliban in whatever form. In that case, the U.S. can adopt a strategy that will 
facilitate the emergence of a secular nationalism among Afghans, a nationalism which can 
counter-balance the nationalism promoted by the Taliban and other religion-based groups. To 
realize this strategy, the U.S. can follow two routes.  
The first approach starts by building a secular Afghan nationalism among the Afghan army. This 
approach starts, for example, when the CIA facilitates the formation of an Afghan “free officers’ 
movement” among the Afghanistan defense forces. The army because of organization, discipline, 
and its ideology of protecting the state and the glory of the nation serves as the best ground to 
hunt for officer who burn with the fire of patriotism and use them as the core of the free officers’ 
movement.  The free officers’ movement nationalism, if properly managed, has the potential to 
serve as an alternative to the Islamist-tainted nationalism of the Taliban and other insurgent 
groups.  
This alternative requires the CIA to look for among the Afghan officer corps for the most 
promising person who can provide leadership for the secret movement. It demands patient 
clandestine work by the CIA to nurture and protect the movement. The U.S. needs to tolerate as 
the army becomes a hotbed of Afghan secular nationalism.  
To counteract the Taliban, what the U.S. wants to have is that Afghanistan produces its own 
Kamal Ataturk or Gamal Abdel Nassar.  In this sense, what Afghanistan may need to have is its 
own version of Kamalism or Nasserism, a fire brand secular nationalism that can take the 
Taliban’s fundamentalist-tainted nationalism head on and win.  The U.S. should let the leading 
army officer play the nationalist card to the full so that the people can rally behind him. But for 
this option to work, the Afghan people must be able to see, first that the Afghan army has 
become independent of the U.S.; and secondly that the movements are likely to restore Afghan 
sovereignty and national dignity.  
If the U.S. chooses this option, then it should allow at least for two to three years for the idea to 






• Can U.S. intelligence find among Afghan army an officer with fervent nationalism, 
someone whose intelligence, charisma and courage can be compared to that of Napoleon, 
Ataturk, Nasser, or Pinochet? The secular nationalists among the army can quickly 
consolidate power only if their Afghan Kamal Ataturk figure is a decisive tactician and 
an eloquent orator.  
• The U.S. must encourage such Kamalism to emerge and coalescence among the Afghan 
army officer corps. The moment such nationalism sweeps through the ranks, the Afghan 
army will be a formidable fighting forces against the Taliban. (Note: At this stage, the 
U.S. forces must recede in their presence and reduce troop levels in the country.) 
• The U.S. must assist the Kamalist movement to remain secret until the time it attempts a 
putsch. The U.S. must do its best to protect the free officers, helping them not to be 
discovered and obliterated by the Taliban. Again the U.S. must not try to save the weak 
central government from being toppled by the free officers’ movement, at some point. 
Letting the democratically elected government fall in this manner is not a sin. It only 
helps the U.S. the original conceptual error it has committed. Supporting a nationalist 
army group take power will put the idea of national-building first. And the army is more 
than likely and able to form an effective state apparatus. The only weakness in the short-
run will be the democracy-building process has to be put on hold for some time in the 
future.  
• The officers in charge of the country, whenever they request the U.S. to pull out its forces 
out of Afghanistan by a certain date, the U.S. must oblige.  For them putting such a 
demand and the U.S. complying to it will make the officers popular among Afghans, 
even among some members of the Taliban and other Islamist groups.  
 
The rate of success of this route could be high if managed wisely. In the past, the CIA had 
engineered several coup d’états in many developing countries successfully. Now the CIA can be 
asked to put its experience to effective use in Afghanistan. If the CIA can pull it off correctly, the 
free officers’ movement option can facilitate America’s exit from Afghanistan by handing over 





show, a military leadership has the potential to lay the groundwork for a prosperous and 
democratic country. At least the experiences of Turkey, South Korea, and Chile show that much.  
iv). Learning from the Iran Playbook 
Iran has some important lessons to teach the U.S. in what it can do to promote its geo-political 
interest. Iran propagates its influence in a geo-political region through local proxy groups. The 
Iran approach is based on the principles of empowerment and rigorous capacity-building of local 
groups. Iran’s geo-political playbook works through two major steps. Iran first identifies a local 
group with which it can collaborate with to promote a common agenda. Second, Iran assists the 
group to build ground up, providing it with required training and logistical support each of the 
way up, until the group becomes a formidable political and military force. Iran has played this 
strategy to remarkable success in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and now in Yemen. The groups Iran has 
nurtured in these places nearly all of them have proved resilient in taking on enemies more 
powerful than them. The U.S. can emulate Iran’s geo-political playbook to effectively counteract 
against the Taliban’s religious nationalism. The U.S. can focus on identifying, selecting, and 
nurturing one or two promising Afghan grassroots organizations to make them develop an 
ideology that can mobilize the Afghan population through a vision of nationalism and economic 
prosperity. 
Nurturing Afghan nationalism among grassroots organizations is interesting to explore because 
not all segments of Afghan society subscribe to the conservative and theocracy-oriented ideology 
of the Taliban and its allied groups.  It is likely and possible that in Afghanistan that various 
grassroots-level groups could exist in their primordial form that harbor a secular type of Afghan 
nationalism. These obscure groups may be just waiting for a powerful ally, like the U.S., to 
discover them and can galvanize them into action. Potential allies for an alternative Afghan 
nationalistic vision may come from any walk of life. The group the U.S. identifies and chooses to 
collaborate with may be sectarian, regional, or ideological in character. The group could be a 
rights movement among farmers, working class, university students, ethnic and religious 
minorities, or women. The group could also be a political party, or a professional association 





Although the U.S. must provide as much support as it can to various civil society groups and 
social movements, its primary focus must be expending more resources on the one organization 
or movement which it thinks holds the most promising potential in projecting an alternative 
nationalism vis-à-vis that of the Taliban. During the entire process the U.S. must premise its 
support to the organization on two important conditions. First, the organization must possess a 
clear ideology and a nationalistic agenda that the U.S. can endorse. Second, the U.S. should 
select and assist groups that can sustain a vision and a commitment that can neutralize or match 
the zeal of the Taliban and its friends.  
The rate of success of the Iran playbook approach depends how much the U.S. can afford to wait 
to see results. This option can probably take a relatively long time to bear its fruits; however, it 
guarantees an enduring outcome, as the alternative Afghan nationalism is built upwards from the 
grassroots level. The alternative nationalistic agenda is sustainable because it does not only rest 
with the elite, but is equally widely disseminated among the people.  
 
Conclusion 
The U.S. has followed a misguided approach in Afghanistan since 2001. The error mainly arises 
from the U.S. mistake in conflating state-building with nation-building. Paradoxically, the U.S. 
boots-on-the ground approach (which is enhanced through series of troop surges) has 
undermined its declared objective of nation-building in that country. This is because, in its 
essence, nation-building means respecting or protecting a country’s national sovereignty. Since 
today many Afghans do not see their government fully autonomous, they have difficulty in 
accepting the veracity of the U.S. mission of nation-building in their country. Inadvertently, the 
U.S. has violated the essence of nation-building; hence, it has instigated the hard-to-defeat 
nationalistic insurgency led by the Taliban. In turn, the insurgency has effectively destroyed the 
U.S. continued efforts in state- and democracy-building in Afghanistan. This futility arose 
because the U.S. has not understood the true meaning of nation-building.  
It is possible for the U.S. to restore full sovereignty to Afghanistan, leaving the country peaceful 
and stable, and no threat to own citizens and neighboring countries.  To realize this goal, the U.S. 





or by involving regional great powers in its peace negotiations with the Taliban, the U.S. can 
pressure the Taliban to moderate its ideology and policy stances. At the end of negotiations, the 
Taliban which returns to power in Kabul will be a force of moderation and not jihadism.  
Second, the U.S. can eschew working with the Taliban about the future of Afghanistan, and 
instead choose to cultivate Afghan nationalism which is secular in character and vision. The 
secular nationalism the U.S. nurtures can serve U.S. interests by proving and alternative 
nationalism Afghans can rally around instead of supporting the religion-laced nationalism of the 
Taliban and its allies. The group the U.S. would sponsor can come either from the Afghan army 
or civil society.  
The U.S. instead of spending treasure and blood to prop up a feeble and ineffective central 
government, should now engage in a re-think of its policy in Afghanistan and take steps that 
could correct the conceptual error it has committed and thereby brought it to such an impasse in 
Afghanistan. The re-think must give emphasis to an agenda that will help it to restore 
Afghanistan’s national sovereignty; thereby correct the original conceptual error it committed in 
its presence and activities.  
The U.S. honorable and satisfying exit from Afghanistan cannot begin until the day the U.S. 
restores Afghanistan’s full national autonomy. The restoration of Afghan full sovereignty can be 
realized by working with a reformed Taliban or by nurturing a secular nationalist group (military 
or civilian). It is only then that the U.S.’s idea of nation-building in Afghanistan gets realized (as 
nation-building as a process demands creating or restoring full-scale national sovereignty).  Only 
after doing this is that the U.S.  has any chance to be invited back — by a sovereign Afghanistan 
state — to assist in state- and democracy-building. 
 
 
 
